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Abstract
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have
gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games
and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and
there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the Restricted
Core for such games with ordered players which is based on the distribution of dividends
taking into account the hierarchical ordering of the players. For totally positive games
this solution is always contained in the Core , and contains the well-known Shapley value
(being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally among the players in
the corresponding coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley
value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this solution to river games.
Keywords: Totally positive TU-game, Harsanyi dividends, Core, Shapley value, Harsanyi
set, Selectope, Digraph, River game.
JEL code: C71 (Cooperative games)
1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, which
assigns to every subset of players or coalition a worth that these players can earn by
cooperation. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoﬀ vectors (possibly empty
or consisting of a unique element) to every TU-game. In a payoﬀ vector provided by a
solution, the payoﬀ assigned to a particular player depends on the payoﬀs that can be
obtained by any coalition of players. The best-known single-valued solution is the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953), the best-known set-valued solution is the Core (Gillies, 1953).
In many economic allocation problems there is some hierarchical ordering of the
players. For example, in the water allocation problem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
agents are located along a river from upstream to downstream, in queueing games as con-
sidered in Maniquet (2003) the players can be ordered by their waiting cost, in sequencing
situations as considered in, e.g. Curiel et al. (1989) the players (jobs) are ordered in an
initial queue, in the auction situations of Graham et al. (1990) the agents can be ordered
by their valuations of the good to be auctioned, and in the airport game of Littlechild and
Owen (1973) the airplanes can be ordered by the cost of the landing strip necessary to
build for these airplanes. Therefore, in this paper we assume that the players in a TU-
game are part of some hierarchical structure that is represented by a directed graph. In
such games with ordered players the payoﬀ assigned to a player may depend on both the
worths of the coalitions as well as the position of the player in the graph. In van den Brink
et al. (2006) a solution for such games with ordered players is introduced that is based
on distributing the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi, 1959) of a game in the spirit of the
Harsanyi set or Selectope. The Harsanyi set , see Vasil’ev (1978, 1981) and Vasil’ev and
van der Laan (2002), assigns to every TU-game all Harsanyi payoff vectors, being those
payoﬀ vectors that are obtained by distributing every dividend in any possible way among
the players in the corresponding coalition. An alternative deﬁnition of this set is given by
the Selectope of a TU-game, see Hammer et al. (1977) and Derks et al. (2000), deﬁned as
the convex hull of all selectope vectors , where the selectope vectors are those vectors where
every dividend is fully assigned to one player of the corresponding coalition. In case all
dividends are nonnegative the Harsanyi set coincides with the Core of the game and thus
consists of all eﬃcient, group stable payoﬀ vectors.
For games with ordered players, van den Brink et al. (2006) modiﬁed the Harsanyi
set by requiring that for any coalition and for any two players i and j within a coalition,
player i gets a share in the dividend of the coalition that is at least as high as the share of
player j, if player i is a superior of j in the ordering of the players. Obviously, because this
puts restrictions on the distributions of the dividends, for every game with ordered players
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this modiﬁed Harsanyi set is a subset of the Harsanyi set of the game without ordering on
the players. In case all dividends are nonnegative it follows that this modiﬁed Harsanyi
set yields a reﬁnement of the Core. Therefore, on this class of games with ordered players
we refer to this modiﬁed Harsanyi set as the Restricted Core. For this class of games the
Restricted Core is non-empty and generalizes both the Core and the Shapley value. In
particular, for any directed graph the Shapley value of the game (without taking account
of the ordering on the players) belongs to the Restricted Core, and it is the unique element
of this set if the ordering is complete, i.e., every player dominates every other player in the
sense that in the directed graph representing the ordering there is a directed arc from each
player i to every other player j. On the other hand, the Restricted Core is a subset of the
Core of the game (without ordered players), and it equals the Core in case the directed
graph representing the ordering is empty, i.e. no player dominates any other player.
For the class of games with ordered players and nonnegative dividends, we pro-
vide a characterization of the Restricted Core solution as the maximal (with respect to
set inclusion) solution that satisﬁes the well-known eﬃciency, null player, additivity and
nonnegativity properties, and a structural monotonicity property which reﬂects the hi-
erarchical aspect of games with ordered players. By adding three more axioms, namely
nonemptyness, convexity and a consistency property, we obtain a full axiomatization with
eight logically independent axioms.
We argue that the Restricted Core yields a reasonable set of payoﬀ vectors for eco-
nomic allocation problems that have an underlying ordering of the players. For example,
van den Brink et al. (2007) show that the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont
(2002) for sharing the water in a river among the agents that are located along that river
from upstream to downstream, is counterintuitive since it allocates the nonnegative divi-
dends of cooperation fully to the most downstream agents in the corresponding coalitions,
while the upstream players have control over the water ﬂow. Applying the Restricted Core
on the ordering from upstream to downstream allocates these dividends in such a way that
upstream agents get a share that is at least equal to the share of downstream agents in the
dividends1.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on TU-
games and deﬁne the class of games with ordered players. In Section 3 we discuss the water
distribution problem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) as a motivating example. In Section
4 we formally introduce the Restricted Core. We also show some of its properties. Section
5 provides characterizations of the Restricted Core solution. In Section 6 we introduce and
1Similar, for sequencing situations, Ferna´ndez et al. (2005) introduce a drop out monotonic solution
that assigns dividends fully to that player of the corresponding coalition who is last in the queue, while
the Restricted Core on the ordering from first to last assigns to players earlier in the queue a share in the
dividend at least equal to that of later players.
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characterize a further reﬁnement of the Restricted Core, the Restricted Selectope which is
a solution for games with ordered players that is deﬁned in line with the Selectope and
assigns to any game with ordered players a (possibly empty) subset of the Restricted Core.
In Section 7 we argue that the Restricted Core provides a reasonable solution for the water
distribution problem. The ﬁnal remarks in Section 8 conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, ..., n} is a ﬁnite set of n players, and v: 2N → R is a characteristic function on N
such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the
members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. Since
we take the player set N to be ﬁxed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function
v and we denote the collection of all TU-games on N by GN . A game v ∈ GN is convex if
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ N .
A special class of TU-games are the unanimity games. Let ΩN = 2N \{∅} denote the
collection of all nonempty subsets of N . Then, for T ∈ ΩN , the unanimity game uT on N is
given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. Writing v as a (2n−1)-dimensional
vector with the worths of the 2n − 1 nonempty coalitions in ΩN as its components, it is
well-known that for every TU-game v, there exist unique weights ∆v(T ) ∈ R such that
v =
∑
T∈ΩN ∆v(T )uT , i.e., v is a unique linear combination of unanimity games. The
weights ∆v(T ), T ∈ ΩN , are usually called the (Harsanyi) dividends of v. Recursively,
solving v(S) =
∑
T⊆S ∆v(T ) on the number of players starting from ∆v({i}) = v({i}) for
the single player coalitions yields ∆v(T ) = v(T ) −
∑
S⊂T ∆v(S) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S)
for T ⊆ N (see Harsanyi (1959)). So, the dividend of a singleton is equal to its worth
while, recursively, the dividends of all other coalitions are equal to their worth minus the
dividends of all proper subcoalitions. In this sense the dividend of a coalition might be
considered as the synergy earnings of cooperation of the coalition that were not yet realized
by its proper subcoalitions.
For a collection of games G ⊆ GN , a set-valued solution F on G assigns a set
F (v) ⊂ Rn of payoﬀ vectors to every TU-game v ∈ G. A single-valued solution f on G
assigns precisely one payoﬀ vector f(v) ∈ Rn to every v ∈ G. Examples of set-valued
solutions are the Core and the Harsanyi set (or Selectope). The Core (Gillies, 1953) of
TU-game v ∈ GN is the set of all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors that are stable in the sense that
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no coalition can do better by separating, and is given by
Core(v) = {x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N}.
As known, the Core of a game is nonempty if and only if v is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva
(1962) or Shapley (1967). Since every convex game is balanced and every totally positive
game is convex, it follows that the Core is nonempty on GN+ .
The Harsanyi set (Vasil’ev 1978, 1981) of v ∈ GN is the set H(v) of payoﬀ vectors
obtained by distributing the dividend of any coalition T ∈ ΩN in any possible way among
the players in T . For T ∈ ΩN , the set of sharing vectors pT ∈ IRn+ is deﬁned as
P T =
pT ∈ IRn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(i) pTi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T,
(ii) pTi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T , and
(iii)
∑
i∈T p
T
i = 1

and a sharing system is a tuple p = [pT ]T∈ΩN with p
T ∈ P T for every T ∈ ΩN = 2N \ {∅}.
Then every sharing system p = [pT ]T∈ΩN yields the corresponding Harsanyi payoff vector
of game v given by
ϕ
p
i (v) =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )p
T
i for all i ∈ N,
i.e., the payoﬀ to player i is given by the sum of its shares in the dividends of the game.
The Harsanyi set H(v) is the collection of all Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors, thus
H(v) =
{
ϕp(v) ∈ Rn
∣∣pT ∈ P T for any T ∈ ΩN } .
It should be noticed that the Harsanyi set of a game is equal to its Selectope, as introduced
in Hammer et al. (1977), see also Derks et al. (2000).
A TU-game v is called totally positive if all dividends are nonnegative. (ﬁnite totally
positive games, as well as their inﬁnite analogs, were introduced in Vasil’ev (1975); for
more details see Vasil’ev (1981, 2006)). We denote the collection of all totally positive
TU-games on N by GN+ . Every totally positive game v is convex.
2. Moreover, for every
v ∈ GN it holds that the Harsanyi set is a subset of the Core, and it equals the Core if v is
totally positive3, for proofs see Vasil’ev (1981), Derks et al. (2000) and Vasil’ev and Van
der Laan (2002).
Proposition 2.1 For every v ∈ GN it holds that H(v) ⊆ Core(v). If v ∈ GN+ then
H(v) = Core(v).
2In fact, every almost positive game is convex, where a game is almost positive if the dividends of all
coalitions with at least two players are nonnegative.
3In fact, for every v ∈ GN it holds that H(v) = Core(v) if and only if v is almost totally positive.
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Further, for every v ∈ GN , H(v) contains the Shapley value of v and thus is nonempty.
Also all marginal value vectors of a game v are contained in H(v).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is the single-valued solution Sh:GN → IRN given
by
Shi(v) =
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆v(S)
|S|
for every i ∈ N.
So, for every game v the Shapley value yields the Harsanyi payoﬀ vector that is obtained
by taking the sharing vectors pT given by pTi =
1
|T | for all i ∈ T and every T ∈ Ω
N , and
thus Sh(v) is in H(v).
Alternatively, the Shapley value is deﬁned as the average of all marginal value
vectors over all permutations of the players. For a permutation π:N → N , assigning rank
number π(i) ∈ N to any player i ∈ N , we deﬁne πi = {j ∈ N |π(j) ≤ π(i)}, i.e., πi is
the set of all players with rank number at most equal to the rank number of i, including i
itself. Then the marginal value vector mπ(v) ∈ IRn of game v and permutation π is given
by mπi (v) = v(π
i)− v(πi \ {i}), i ∈ N . For convex games each marginal value vector lies in
the Core of the game. For every game each marginal vector lies in the Harsanyi set. More
precisely, for permutation π and coalition T ∈ ΩN , let i(T ) be the player in T such that
π(j) ≤ π(i(T )) for all j ∈ T , i.e., i(T ) is the player in T with the highest rank number.
Then mπ(v) ∈ H(v) is the Harsanyi payoﬀ vector corresponding to the sharing system
p = [pT ]T∈ΩN with p
T (π) ∈ P T deﬁned by pTi(T )(π) = 1 and p
T
j (π) = 0 for all j = i(T ) (see
e.g. Derks et al. 2006).
2.2 Games with ordered players
In this paper we assume the players to be part of a hierarchical structure that is represented
by a directed graph. A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N,D) where N = {1, ..., n} is a
ﬁnite set of nodes (representing the players) and D ⊆ N×N is a binary relation on N . We
assume D to be irreﬂexive, i.e., (i, i) ∈ D for all i ∈ N . The collection of all (irreﬂexive)
binary relations on N is denoted by DN . Observe that D is a collection of ordered pairs.
Since we take the ﬁnite set N to be ﬁxed, we represent a digraph on N by its collection D
of ordered pairs. For i, j ∈ N , a path between i and j in D is a sequence of diﬀerent nodes
(i1, . . . , im) such that i1 = i, im = j, and {(ik, ik+1), (ik+1, ik)}∩D = ∅ for k = 1, . . . ,m−1.
A path (i1, . . . , im) is a directed path if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1. A directed path
(i1, . . . , im) is a cycle in D if m ≥ 2 and (im, i1) ∈ D. We call digraph D acyclic if there
are no cycles.
A game with ordered players is a pair (v,D) with v ∈ GN a characteristic function
and D ∈ DN a directed graph with set N as its set of nodes. In this paper we only consider
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pairs (v,D) with v ∈ GN+ a totally positive game, however we often just shortly refer to
a pair (v,D) ∈ GN+ × D
N as a game with ordered players. The digraph D represents an
ordered structure on the set of players. Player i ∈ N dominates player j ∈ N if (i, j) ∈ D,
i.e., when, in the ordering i is a predecessor of j (and thus j a successor of i). Observe that
we allow that D contains cycles, so that it is possible that a player i1 has a successor i2, i2
has a successor i3 and so on to some player im that is a predecessor of i1. If m = 2, then i1
is a predecessor of i2 and i2 of i1. Although one might argue that an order should satisfy
certain properties, for instance the ordering is a hierarchical structure without cycles, in
this paper we refer to any structure that is represented by a digraph as an order, including
the empty digraph D = ∅ and the complete digraph D = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i = j}. We
already remark here that the characterization results in Sections 5 and 6 will hold for any
subclass E ⊆ DN of digraphs, so also if one restricts to acyclic structures, rooted trees, and
even to classes of digraphs that consist of only one digraph.
For a collection G ×E ⊆ GN ×DN of games with ordered players, a solution F :G ×
E → Rn assigns a set F(v,D) ⊂ Rn of payoﬀ vectors to every (v,D) ∈ G × E . Possible
solutions that do not take into account the ordering of the players are for instanceF(v,D) =
Core(v) or F(v,D) = H(v) for every (v,D) ∈ G × E . For the class of games GN+ × D
N
of totally positive games with ordered players, in Section 4 we introduce a solution that
distributes the Harsanyi dividends in such a way that higher ordered players get at least
the same share in a dividend than lower ranked players in the corresponding coalition.
In the next section we ﬁrst discuss a motivating example of a totally positive game with
ordered players.
We conclude this subsection with a few further notions on directed graphs. For
T ∈ ΩN , the subgraph of (N,D) restricted to T is given by (T,D(T )) with D(T ) =
{(i, j) ∈ D | i, j ∈ T}. A set of nodes T ⊆ N is connected in D if, for every i, j ∈ T
there is a path (i1, . . . , im) between i and j such that {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ T , i.e., between every
two nodes in T there is a path in D that only contains nodes of T . A set S ∈ ΩN is
comprehensive from above in D if [j ∈ S and (i, j) ∈ D] implies that i ∈ S, i.e., for every
player j in S also all predecessors of j are in S. A set S is complete in D when S is
connected and comprehensive from above in D. Finally, for nonempty T ⊆ N , we denote
CTD as the set of complete subsets of T in the subgraph (T,D(T )).
3 The water distribution problem
In their paper ‘Sharing a river’, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of the
optimal distribution of water to agents located along a river from upstream to downstream.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players representing the agents on the river, numbered
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successively from upstream to downstream, and let ei ≥ 0 be the ﬂow of water entering the
river between player i− 1 and i, i = 1, . . . , n, with e1 the inﬂow before the most upstream
player 1. Further it is assumed that each player has a quasi-linear utility function given
by ui(xi, ti) = b
i(xi)+ ti where ti is a monetary compensation to player i, xi is the amount
of water allocated to player i, and bi: IR+ → IR is a continuous nondecreasing function
yielding the beneﬁt bi(xi) to player i of the consumption xi of water. An allocation is a
pair (x, t) ∈ IRn+ × IR
n of water distribution and compensation scheme, satisfying
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0 and
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j = 1, . . . , n.
The ﬁrst condition is a budget condition and says that the total amount of compensations
is nonpositive, i.e., the compensations only redistribute the total welfare. The second
condition reﬂects that any player can use the water that entered upstream, but that the
water inﬂow downstream of some player can not be allocated to this player. So, for any j,
the sum of the water uses x1, . . . , xj is at most equal to the sum of the inﬂows e1, . . . , ej.
Because of the quasi-linearity and the possibility of making money transfers, an
allocation is Pareto optimal (eﬃcient) if and only if the distribution of the water streams
maximizes the total beneﬁts, i.e., the optimal water distribution x∗ ∈ IRn+ solves the max-
imization problem:
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j = 1, . . . , n, and xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.1)
A welfare distribution allocates the total beneﬁts of an optimal water distribution x∗ over
the players, i.e., it is a vector z ∈ IRn assigning utility zi to player i and satisfying
∑n
i=1 zi =∑n
i=1 b
i(x∗i ). Clearly, any welfare distribution z can be implemented by the allocation (x, t)
with xi = x
∗
i and ti = zi − b
i(x∗i ), i = 1, . . . , n.
The problem to ﬁnd a ‘fair’ welfare distribution can be modelled by the following
game (N, v). Obviously, the worth v(N) is given by v(N) =
∑n
i=1 b
i(x∗i ) with x
∗ ∈ IRn+
a solution of the maximization problem (3.1). Further, for any pair of players i, j with
j > i it holds that water inﬂow entering the river before the upstream player i can only be
allocated to the downstream player j if all players between i and j cooperate, otherwise
any player between i and j can take the ﬂow from i to j for its own use. Hence, a coalition
T is admissible if and only if T is a coalition of consecutive players along the river, i.e.,
T = {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. In the sequel we denote such a coalition of consecutive players by
[i, j]. For any consecutive coalition [i, j] its worth v([i, j]) is given by
v([i, j]) =
j∑
h=i
bh(x
[i,j]
h ) where x
[i,j] = (x
[i,j]
h )
j
h=i solves
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max
xi,...,xj
j∑
h=i
bh(xh) s.t.
h∑
k=i
xk ≤
h∑
k=i
ek, h = i, . . . , j, and xk ≥ 0, k = i, . . . , j. (3.2)
For any other (non-consecutive) coalition S it holds that v(S) is equal to the sum of the
worths of its maximal consecutive subsets4. We refer to this game as the river game. In
the sequel we take the following assumption from Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
Assumption 3.1 In the river game every benefit function bi: IR+ → IR is differentiable
with derivative going to infinity as xi tends to zero, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Under this assumption the river game is a totally positive game. This follows from
the following more general result. We say that a TU-game v ∈ GN is a line-graph game
on linear order (1, 2, . . . , n) if for every coalition S ⊆ N it holds that v(S) equals the sum
of the worths of all maximal consecutive subsets of S, see Greenberg and Weber (1986).
Note that this is equivalent to saying that the dividend of every nonconsecutive coalition
is zero, see e.g. Owen (1986) and Bilbao (1998). It turns out that for this class of games,
convexity is equivalent to totally positiveness.
Proposition 3.2 Let v be a line-graph game with v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Then v is
convex if and only if v is totally positive.
Proof. It is known that a totally positive TU-game is convex. So, we only have to show
that for line-graph games also the reverse holds. Therefore, let v be a convex line-graph
game with v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . From v({i}) ≥ 0 it follows that ∆v({i}) ≥ 0, i ∈ N .
In van den Brink et al. (2007) it is shown that the dividend of a consecutive coalition
S = [i, j] consisting of at least two players, is given by
∆v([i, j]) = v([i, j])− v([i+ 1, j])− v([i, j − 1]) + v([i+ 1, j − 1]).
With S = [i, j] and T = [i + 1, j − 1] (with T = ∅ if j < i + 2), the convexity of v
implies that v([i, j]) + v([i + 1, j − 1]) ≥ v([i + 1, j]) + v([i, j − 1]). Hence it follows that
that ∆v([i, j]) ≥ 0 for any consecutive coalition [i, j], i = j. As stated already above, any
nonconsecutive coalition has zero dividend. So, v is totally positive. 
Although an arbitrary convex game v does not need to be totally positive, Proposi-
tion 3.2 shows that for line-graph games these properties are equivalent. Under Assumption
3.1, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) have shown that the river game is convex. Clearly, the
river game is also a line-graph game on the linear order (1, 2, . . . , n) and thus Proposition
3.2 applies. Further recall from Proposition 2.1 that H(v) = Core(v) when v is totally
positive. So we have the following corollary.
4A subset T of S is maximal consecutive if T is consecutive and T∪h is not consecutive for any h ∈ S\T .
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Corollary 3.3 Let v be the river game associated to a water distribution problem with
benefit functions satisfying Assumption 3.1. Then v is totally positive, ∆v(T ) = 0 if T is
nonconsecutive, and H(v) = Core(v).
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose as solution for the water distribution problem
the vector mu(v), being the marginal value vector mπ with respect to the permutation
π(i) = i for all i ∈ N , i.e., the vector given by mu1(v) = v({1}) and m
u
i (v) = v([1, i]) −
v([1, i − 1]), i = 2, . . . , n. They show that this is the unique payoﬀ vector that is both
core-stable (i.e., lies in the Core) and fair . This fairness property means that no coalition
S gets a payoﬀ above its aspiration level, deﬁned as the maximum worth S can attain by an
optimal distribution among its members of the water inﬂows of all players 1, . . . , s, where
s = max{h|h ∈ S}, so also using the water inﬂows of the players not in S, but upstream
to the most downstream member of S. So, the fairness property requires that the total
payoﬀ to coalition [i, j] is at most v([i, j]). On the other hand, core-stableness requires
that coalition [1, j] receives at least v([1, j]). Therefore, core-stableness and fairness imply
that the total payoﬀ to the players in coalition [1, j] should be equal to v([1, j]), which
yields mu(v) as the unique outcome. Observing that mu(v) is the marginal value vector
of the game with respect to the permutation π(i) = i for all i, it indeed follows from the
convexity of the game that mu(v) is in the Core of the game.
Although core-stableness and fairness seem to be reasonble properties, the unique
outcome resulting from these two properties is quite counterintuitive. For every i < n,
we have that the total payoﬀ of the player in the consecutive coalition [i, j] upstream of i
(including i itself) is equal to v([1, i]), while the total payoﬀ to the downstream coalition
[i+ 1, n] is equal to v(N)− v([1, i]) ≥ v([i+ 1, n]), i.e., all additional proﬁt that is realised
when the two coalitions [1, i] and [i + 1, n] merge to the grand coalition N goes to the
downstream coalition. However, any upstream coalition [1, i] can prevent that coalition
[i+1, n] gets more than v[i+1, n] by using all inﬂows e1, . . . , ei by itself. So, although the
coalition [1, i] can play some type of ultimatum game by claiming that they will use their
total water inﬂow
∑i
h=1 ei by themselves unless the players of the downstream coalition
[i + 1, j] are willing to give almost all proﬁt of cooperation to the upstream coalition,
the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont does the reverse, all proﬁt goes to the
downstream coalition. Putting it diﬀerently, recall from the end of Subsection 2.1 that the
marginal value vector mu(v) corresponding to permutation π(i) = i is also obtained by
assigning the nonnegative dividend ∆v([i, j]) of any consecutive coalition [i, j] to the most
downstream player j in that coalition. It shows that the Ambec and Sprumont solution
has a drawback that a player is not rewarded for letting pass the water from its upstream
players to its downstream players and thus does not give any incentive to a player i to
cooperate with its successors downstream along the river. Even if one agrees with the
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idea that downstream players should get a share in the dividends at least as high as the
shares of upstream players, it seems that giving dividends fully to downstream players is
too extreme.
Alternatively, the vector ml(v) being the marginal value vector mπ with respect
to the permutation π(i) = n − i + 1 assigns every dividend ∆v([i, j]) fully to the most
upstream player i and yields payoﬀs mln(v) = v({n}) and m
l
i(v) = v([i, n]) − v([i + 1, n])
for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Maybe assigning every dividend to the most upstream player in
the coalition is also too extreme (of course, not more extreme than assigning it to the
most downstream player), but since any upstream coalition [1, i] can prevent that any
downstream coalition [i + 1, n] gets more than v([i + 1, n]) by distributing all its water
inﬂows among themselves, it seems to be reasonable that for two players h and k in a
consecutive coalition T , the share of player h in the dividend of coalition T is at least equal
to the share of k when player k is located downstream to player h.
In the next sections we will see that the latter outcomes are indeed obtained by
applying the Restricted Core for games with nonnegative dividends (which is the solution
introduced in this paper) to the river game. Therefore, we consider the linear ordering D
given by
D = {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | j = i+ 1},
in which the players along the river are ordered from upstream to downstream, and consider
the game with ordered players (v,D), where v is the totally positive river game given by
(3.1) and (3.2). So D represents the situation that any player j needs the cooperation of
its upstream neighbor i = j − 1 to receive water from its upstream players 1, . . . , j − 1.
Observe that a coalition S is connected inD if and only if S is a coalition [i, j] of consecutive
players. Therefore, only connected coalitions in D have a nonzero dividend in the river
game. The Restricted Core consists of all payoﬀ vectors obtained by requiring that, for
every consecutive coalition [i, j], the share of player h ∈ [i, j−1] in the dividend of coalition
[i, j] is at least equal to the share of it downstream neighbour h+1. Since for totally positive
games every allocation obtained by distributing the dividends belongs to the Core of the
game, by restricting the way in which the dividends are distributed we obtain a reﬁnement
of the Core.
4 The Restricted Core
In this section we propose a solution F on the class GN+ ×D
N of totally positive games with
ordered players. As suggested in the previous section, the solution distributes dividends
among players in such a way that higher ordered players get at least the same share in a
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dividend than lower ranked players in the corresponding coalition. So, considering a totally
positive TU-game v ∈ GN+ and a digraph D ∈ D
N , we require for every coalition T and two
players i, j ∈ T that player i gets at least as much as player j from the dividend ∆v(T ) if
(i, j) ∈ D. This is obtained by restricting ourselves to sharing systems p = [pT ]T∈ΩN such
that for any T ∈ ΩN the sharing vector pT belongs to the subset P TD of P
T given by
P TD = {p
T ∈ P T |pTi ≥ p
T
j for all i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D}.
Now we propose as solution concept for totally positive games with ordered players the
set of all Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors corresponding to a sharing system p = [pT ]T∈ΩN with
pT ∈ P TD for all T ∈ Ω
N . Since for totally positive games the Harsanyi set is equal to the
Core, the collection of all these Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors is a subset of the Core. Therefore
the solution is called the Restricted Core and denoted by RC.
Definition 4.1 The Restricted Core of a totally positive game with ordered players (v,D) ∈
GN+ ×D
N is the set
RC(v,D) =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣x = ∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )p
T , pT ∈ P TD for any T ∈ Ω
N
}
.
Example 4.2 Consider a market situation with two buyers and one seller of a good.
The buyers both want only one item of the good, and the seller ownd two items of
the good. Both buyers are prepared to pay 1 for an item, while the reservation value
of the seller is zero. This situation can be represented by the TU-game v on N =
{1, 2, 3} with player 1 being the seller and the other two players being the buyers, with
v given by v(N) = 2, v({1, j}) = 1 if j ∈ {2, 3}, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Since
v = u{1,2} + u{1,3}, the coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3} have dividend 1, while the dividends
of all other coalitions is zero. The unrestricted Core of this game is given by5 Core(v) =
Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 0, 1)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 1)⊤}), see Figure 1.
Now, consider the game with ordered players (v,D) on N = {1, 2, 3} with v as given before
and D = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}. The Restricted Core is given by RC(v,D) = {x = (x1, x2, x3)⊤ ∈
R
3|x1 = p
{1,2}
1 + p
{1,3}
1 , x2 = p
{1,2}
2 , x3 = p
{1,3}
3 and p
T ∈ P TD , T ∈ Ω
N} with P {1,3}D =
{p{1,3} ∈ P {1,3}|p{1,3}1 ≥ p
{1,3}
3 } and P
{2,3}
D = {p
{2,3} ∈ P {2,3}|p{2,3}2 ≥ p
{2,3}
3 }. It follows that
RC(v,D) = Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (1
2
, 1, 1
2
)⊤, (11
2
, 0, 1
2
)⊤}). This is the dashed subset
of Core(v), see Figure 1. Note that the Shapley value Sh(v) = (1, 1
2
, 1
2
)⊤ of game v belongs
to RC(v,D). 
5In the sequel, Conv(A) denotes the convex hull of A ⊂ Rn.
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Figure 1: Core(v) and RC(v,D) of Example 4.2.
In Example 4.2 the Restricted Core of the game with ordered players appears to be a
subset of the Core of the original game. Moreover, the Shapley value of the unrestricted
game belongs to the Restricted Core. Both these facts hold in general.6
Theorem 4.3 For every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N it holds that Sh(v) ∈ RC(v,D) ⊆ Core(v).
Proof. Let (v,D) ∈ GN+ × D
N . Take pTi =
1
|T | if i ∈ T , and p
T
i = 0 otherwise. Clearly,∑
T∈ΩN ∆v(T )p
T = Sh(v) and pT ∈ P TD for every D ∈ D
N and T ∈ ΩN . Thus, Sh(v) ∈
RC(v,D). The inclusion RC(v,D) ⊆ Core(v) follows immediately from P TD ⊆ P
T , T ∈ ΩN .

Note that Sh(v) ∈ RC(v,D) implies that RC(v,D) = ∅ for all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×
DN . The Restricted Core RC(v,D) generalizes the Shapley value and the Core for totally
positive TU-games in the sense that the corresponding inclusions in Theorem 4.3 can be
equalities. Let Dc denote the complete irreﬂexive digraph given by Dc = {(i, j) ∈ N ×N |
i = j}.
Theorem 4.4 Let D ∈ DN . Then
(i) RC(v,D) = {Sh(v)} for every v ∈ GN+ if and only if D = D
c;
(ii) RC(v,D) = Core(v) for every v ∈ GN+ if and only if D = ∅.
Proof. (i) If When D = Dc, then (i, j) ∈ D for all i, j, i = j. Thus for all T ∈ ΩN ,
we have P TD = {p
T ∈ P T |pTi = p
T
j for all i, j ∈ T} = {p
T ∈ P T |pTi =
1
|T | for all i ∈ T}.
So RC(v,D) = {Sh(v)}. Only if Suppose that D = Dc, i.e., there exist i, j ∈ N, i = j,
6We remark that Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 hold for any game (not necessarily totally positive) with ordered
players, but then with respect to the Restricted Harsanyi Set as introduced in van den Brink et al. (2006).
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with (i, j) ∈ D. Take v = u{i,j} and let e
j ∈ IRN be given by ejj = 1 and e
j
h = 0 for all
h ∈ N \ {j}. Then ej ∈ RC(v,D), but ej = Sh(v).
(ii) If Take D = ∅. Then P TD = P
T for every T ∈ ΩN , implying that RC(v,D) = H(v) =
Core(v), where the latter equality follows from v ∈ GN+ . Only if Suppose that D = ∅, i.e.,
there exist i, j ∈ N, i = j, with (i, j) ∈ D. Again, take v = u{i,j} and consider e
j ∈ IRN .
Then ej ∈ Core(v) although ej ∈ RC(v,D). 
For every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N the set of payoﬀ vectors RC(v,D) is a polytope in Rn.
To ﬁnd the extreme points of RC(v,D), the following theorem from van den Brink et al.
(2008) is useful and will be applied later. For S ⊆ N , let aS ∈ IRn be the vector with
components aSi =
1
|S| when i ∈ S and a
S
i = 0, otherwise. The theorem characterizes the
extreme points of P TD as those vectors a
S corresponding to complete subsets of T .
Theorem 4.5 (van den Brink et al. 2008)
For T ⊆ N , the set of extreme points of P TD is given by
Ex(P TD) = {a
S ∈ IRn | S ∈ CTD}.
5 Characterization of the Restricted Core
We ﬁrst state four axioms for a solution F on GN+ ×D
N , that are generalizations of standard
axioms in cooperative game theory as discussed for standard TU-games in Vasil’ev (1981)
and Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002).
Axiom (Efficiency) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ × D
N , any payoﬀ vector in the solution is eﬃ-
cient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) for all x ∈ F(v,D).
Recall that a player i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ GN if v(S) = v(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom (Null player property) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N , any payoﬀ vector x ∈ F(v,D)
satisﬁes xi = 0, whenever i is a null player in v.
Axiom (Additivity) For all v, w ∈ GN+ and D ∈ D
N , it holds that F(v + w,D) =
F(v,D) + F(w,D), where (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom (Nonnegativity) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N , it holds that F(v,D) ⊆ IRn+.
The next axiom reﬂects the ordering of the players within the digraph. Since the players
payoﬀs should depend on their contributions in the game v as well as their positions in
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the digraph D, we cannot say that players should always earn at least as much as their
successors. However, if a player vetoes one of its successors, then we require that this
vetoing predecessor earns at least as much as its vetoed successor7. Player i vetoes player
j ∈ N \{i} in game v if v(S) = v(S \{j}) for all S ⊆ N \{i}, i.e., i vetoes j if the marginal
contribution of j to any coalition not containing i is equal to zero.
Axiom (Structural monotonicity) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ × D
N , any payoﬀ vector x ∈
F(v,D) satisﬁes xi ≥ xj whenever (i, j) ∈ D and i vetoes j in v.
The next lemma says that each coalition containing j but not i has zero dividend when i
vetoes j.
Lemma 5.1 If i vetoes j in v ∈ GN+ , then ∆v(T ) = 0 for any T ⊆ N \{i} such that j ∈ T .
Proof. If i vetoes j in v ∈ GN+ then ∆v({j}) = v({j}) = 0. Now, consider T ⊆ N \ {i}
with j ∈ T . For T = {j}, ∆v(T ) = v(T ) = 0. Proceeding by induction, assume that
∆v(T
′) = 0 for all T ′ ⊂ T with j ∈ T ′. Then ∆v(T ) = v(T ) −
∑
S⊂T
S =∅
∆v(S) = v(T ) −∑
S⊆T\{j}
S =∅
∆v(S) −
∑
S⊂T
j∈S
∆v(S) = v(T )− v(T \ {j})− 0 by the induction hypothesis. But
then ∆v(T ) = 0 since v(T ) = v(T \ {j}) by i vetoing j and T ⊆ N \ {i}. 
The next theorem says that the Restricted Core solution satisﬁes the above ﬁve axioms on
the class GN+ ×D
N of totally positive games with ordered players.
Theorem 5.2 The Restricted Core solution RC satisfies efficiency, the null player prop-
erty, additivity, nonnegativity and structural monotonicity on GN+ ×D
N .
Proof. RC satisfying eﬃciency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity
follows similar as this is shown for corresponding properties of the Harsanyi set solution H
for TU-games on GN in Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002). To show structural monotonicity,
for (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N , let v =
∑
T∈ΩN ∆v(T )uT , and let i, j ∈ N be such that i vetoes j in
v and (i, j) ∈ D. For some T , let xT be an element in RC(∆v(T )uT , D). Then there is a
pT ∈ P TD such that x
T
h = ∆v(T )p
T
h for all h ∈ T . We consider four cases.
(i) If i, j ∈ T , then xTi = ∆v(T )p
T
i ≥ ∆v(T )p
T
j = x
T
j (with equality if also (j, i) ∈ D) since
pTi ≥ p
T
j and ∆v(T ) ≥ 0.
(ii) If i ∈ T , j ∈ T , then xTi ≥ 0 = x
T
j since ∆v(T ) ≥ 0.
(iii) If i ∈ T , j ∈ T , then ∆v(T ) = 0 by Lemma 5.1 and thus xTj = 0 = x
T
i .
(iv) If i, j ∈ T , then xTi = x
T
j = 0.
7For point-valued solutions this is weaker than a similar property introduced in van den Brink and
Gilles (1996) who do not require the predecessor to veto the successor.
14
So, in all cases we have that xTi ≥ x
T
j when x
T ∈ RC(∆v(T )uT , D), i vetoes j in v and
(i, j) ∈ D. By RC satisfying additivity we have that RC(v,D) =
∑
T∈ΩN RC(∆v(T )uT , D)
for every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N . So, for each x ∈ RC(v,D), there exist xT ∈ RC(∆v(T )uT , D),
T ∈ ΩN , such that x =
∑
T∈ΩN x
T . Since xTi ≥ x
T
j for all T , structural monotonicity is
satisﬁed. 
Next we show that on the class of totally positive games with ordered players the Restricted
Core solution is the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisﬁes the ﬁve
axioms mentioned above.
Theorem 5.3 If solution F on GN+ × D
N satisfies efficiency, the null player property,
additivity, nonnegativity and structural monotonicity, then F(v,D) ⊆ RC(v,D) for all
(v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N .
Proof. Suppose that solution F on GN+ × D
N satisﬁes the ﬁve properties. For x ∈
F(∆v(T )uT ,D), T ∈ ΩN , the null player property implies that xi = 0 for all i ∈ N \T , and
eﬃciency implies that
∑
i∈T xi = ∆v(T ). With nonnegativity it follows that xi ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ T . Since i, j ∈ T veto each other in uT , structural monotonicity implies that xi ≥ xj for
all i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D. Hence, x ∈ ∆v(T )P TD and, consequently, x ∈ RC(∆v(T )uT , D).
The latter inclusion shows that F(∆v(T )uT ,D) ⊆ RC(∆v(T )uT ,D). Finally, additivity of
F and RC implies that F(v,D) =
∑
T∈ΩN F(∆v(T )uT , D) ⊆
∑
T∈ΩN RC(∆v(T )uT , D) =
RC(v,D) for all v ∈ GN+ and D ∈ D
N . 
Notice that the proofs of the Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 also hold on any subset of digraphs
E of DN , and thus the results hold for any solution on any subclass GN+ × E , E ⊆ D
N .
So, (i) for any E ⊆ DN , the Restricted Harsanyi set solution RC satisﬁes eﬃciency, the
null player property, additivity, nonnegativity and structural monotonicity on GN+ × E ,
and (ii) if solution F on GN+ × E satisﬁes these properties then F(v,D) ⊆ RC(v,D) for
all (v,D) ∈ GN+ × E . In particular this holds when E is the class of all acyclic directed
graphs or the class of all rooted (directed) trees. But also when E only contains the empty
digraph (N,D) with D = ∅ as its unique element. In that case GN+ ×E reduces to the class
GN+ of totally positive games and, according to (ii) of Theorem 4.4, RC(v, ∅) = Core(v)
for all v ∈ GN+ . Moreover, in this case the structural monotonicity property gives no
restriction, and thus Theorem 5.3 characterizes the Core on the class of totally positive
games as the ‘maximal’ (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisﬁes eﬃciency,
the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity.8 On the other hand, when E only
contains the complete (irreﬂexive) digraph (N,D) with D = Dc as its unique element,
8Here we should redefine efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity for TU-games
by adapting the corresponding axioms for games with ordered players in a straightforward way.
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then RC(v,Dc) = {Sh(v)} for all v ∈ GN+ , and structural monotonicity requires unanimity
symmetry (i.e., in a unanimity game all players of the unanimity coalition earn the same).
In this case we obtain a characterization of the Shapley value for totally positive TU-
games as the unique solution satisfying eﬃciency, the null player property, additivity and
unanimity symmetry. Notice that in this case the nonnegativity axiom (although satisﬁed
by the Shapley value) is superﬂuous in the characterization.
Corollary 5.4 On the class GN+ of totally positive TU-games:
(i) the Core solution satisfies efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnega-
tivity;
(ii) if solution F on GN+ satisfies efficiency, the null player property, additivity and non-
negativity, then F (v) ⊆ Core(v) for all v ∈ GN+ ;
(iii) the Shapley value is the unique single-valued solution on GN+ that satisfies efficiency,
the null player property, additivity and unanimity symmetry.
We obtain a full axiomatization of the Restricted Core solution if we add the following
three axioms, of which the ﬁrst two are standard in game theory.
Axiom (Nonemptyness) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N , the set F(v,D) ⊂ IRn is not empty.
Axiom (Convexity) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N , the set F(v,D) ⊂ IRn is convex.
The last property is a consistency property. First, we deﬁne the coalitional proxy game of
a coalition T with respect to a subset R of T . In this game the coalition R ⊆ T acts as a
proxy for T in the sense that the dividend of a coalition T is assigned to its subset R by
giving every player in R an equal share in the dividend of T . This yields the coalitional
proxy game vR,T given by
vR,T (S) = v˜(S) +
|R ∩ S|
|R|
∆v(T ), S ⊆ N,
where v˜ = v − ∆v(T )uT is the game with v˜(S) = v(S) − ∆v(T ) for every S such that
T ⊆ S, and v˜(S) = v(S) otherwise. Note that vR,T (N) = v(N), and thus any eﬃcient
solution distributes the same amount in games v and vR,T . The next lemma follows by
straightforward calculation of the dividends and is given without proof.
Lemma 5.5 For T ⊆ N and R ⊆ T the dividends of game vR,T are given by
∆vR,T (S) =

0 if S = T,
∆v(S) +
1
|R|∆v(T ) if S = {j} and j ∈ R,
∆v(S) otherwise.
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The lemma shows that coalition T is a ‘null coalition’ in game vR,T , in the sense that its
dividend is zero, while the dividends of all single players in R are increased with a fraction
1
|R| of the dividend of T . We now state the coalitional consistency property. Recall that
CTD is the collection of subsets of T that are complete (i.e., connected and comprehensive
from above) in the subgraph (T,D(T )) of (N,D).
Axiom (Coalitional consistency) For every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N and every R ∈ CTD with
T ∈ ΩN , it holds that F(vR,T ,D) ⊆ F(v,D).
This property9 says that by allocating the dividend of a coalition T equally among the
players of any complete subset R of that coalition T, we do not obtain new payoﬀ vectors
in the solution. Going from a game v with ordered players to the coalitional proxy game
vR,T with R ∈ CTD and the same ordering of the players, we do not yet assign payoﬀs
to the players, but we allocate one of the coalitional dividends to singleton dividends.
Considering this as a partial solution, the consistency requirement states that the payoﬀ
vectors assigned to the new game should also be payoﬀ vectors in the original game.
To prove that RC(v,D) is characterized by the eight axioms stated above, we ﬁrst
state three lemmas.
Lemma 5.6 Let F be a solution on GN+ ×D
N satisfying efficiency, the null player property,
nonnegativity and structural monotonicity. Then for any D ∈ DN and T ∈ ΩN , we have
that F(uT , D) ⊆ P TD .
Proof. Let x ∈ F(uT , D). Then, from eﬃciency it follows that
∑
i∈N xi = 1 and by
nonnegativity we have that xi ≥ 0, i ∈ N . From the null player property we have that
xi = 0 if i ∈ N \ T . Finally, from structural monotonicity we obtain that for any two
players i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D it holds that xi ≥ xj . Hence F(uT , D) ⊆ P TD . 
In the proof of the next lemma we apply Theorem 4.5 on the extreme points of P TD .
Lemma 5.7 Let F be a solution on GN+ × D
N satisfying nonemptyness, convexity, ef-
ficiency, the null player property, additivity and coalitional consistency. Then for any
D ∈ DN and T ∈ ΩN , we have that P TD ⊆ F(uT ,D).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 5.5 that for R ⊆ T the game wR,T = (uT )R,T satisﬁes
wR,T =
∑
i∈R
1
|R|
u{i}.
9We remark that this is a different kind of consistency than reduced game consistency which is often
used in characterizing solutions for cooperative games.
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From the nonemptyness, eﬃciency and the null player property it follows that for any D,
F( 1|R|u{i}, D) = {
1
R
a{i}}, i ∈ N . Additivity implies that F(wR,T , D) =
∑
i∈R F(
1
|R|u{i}, D)
=
∑
i∈R {
1
|R|a
{i}} = {aR}. Hence coalitional consistency implies that aR ∈ F(uT , D) for
any R ∈ CTD. Finally, with Theorem 4.5, convexity implies that P
T
D = Conv({a
R, R ∈
CTD}) ⊆ F(uT , D). 
Lemma 5.8 Let F be a solution on GN+ × D
N satisfying nonemptyness, convexity, ef-
ficiency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity, structural monotonicity and
coalitional consistency. Then for any D ∈ DN , T ∈ ΩN and c > 0, we have that
F(cuT , D) = cP TD .
Proof. For c = 1, the statement follows immediately from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7. For
positive c = 1 it follows from the fact that the set of extreme points of cP TD is given by
Ex(cP TD) = cEx(P
T
D). The result then follows by repeating the reasoning given in the
Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7 for the games cuT . 
We now come to a full axiomatization of the Restricted Core.
Theorem 5.9 A solution F on GN+ × D
N satisfies nonemptyness, convexity, efficiency,
the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity, structural monotonicity and coalitional
consistency if and only if F is the Restricted Core solution.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the Restricted Core solution satisﬁes these
properties on GN+ × D
N . To show uniqueness, suppose that a solution F on GN+ × D
N
satisﬁes the eight axioms. From additivity and Lemma 5.8 we obtain that F(v,D) =∑
T∈ΩN F(∆v(T )uT , D) =
∑
T∈ΩN ∆v(T )P
T
D = RC(v,D). 
We end this section by showing logical independence of the eight axioms in Theorem 5.9
using the following alternative solutions on GN+ ×D
N .
1. Solution FN given by FN(v,D) = ∅ satisﬁes all axioms except nonemptyness.
2. Solution FC given by FC(v,D) =
∑
T∈ΩN Ex(P
T
D) satisﬁes all axioms except convex-
ity.
3. Solution FE given by FE(v,D) = µRC(v,D) for some positive µ = 1, satisﬁes all
axioms except eﬃciency.
4. Deﬁne v ∈ IRn by vi =
1
|N |
v(N). Solution FNP given by FNP (v,D) = µ{v} +
(1 − µ)RC(v,D), for some µ, 0 < µ < 1, satisﬁes all axioms except the null player
property.
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5. For game v ∈ GN , deﬁne game v ∈ GN by v =
(∑
T⊆N,T =∅∆v(T )
)
uN(v), where N(v)
is the set of non-null players in v. Solution FA given by
FA(v,D) =
{
RC(v,D) if v(N) ≥ 10
RC(v,D) if v(N) < 10
satisﬁes all axioms except additivity.
6. For some ǫ > 0, deﬁne P T (ǫ) = {pT ∈ IRn | pTi = 0, if i ∈ T, p
T
i ≥ −ǫ if
i ∈ T , and
∑
i∈T p
T
i = 1, T ∈ Ω
N}, and deﬁne the solution RCǫ by RCǫ(v,D) =∑
T∈2N\{∅} ∆v(T )P
T
D(ǫ). Solution FNN given by FNN (v,D) = RC
ǫ(v,D) satisﬁes all
axioms except nonnegativity.
7. Solution FSM given by FSM(v,D) = Core(v) satisﬁes all axioms except structural
monotonicity.
8. Solution FCC given by FCC(v,D) = {Sh(v)} satisﬁes all axioms except coalitional
consistency.
6 The Restricted Selectope
The Selectope, introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) is a solution for TU-games that is
equivalent to the Harsanyi set, and thus yields an alternative deﬁnition of this solution,
see also Derks et al. (2000). For totally positive games the selectope thus yields another
deﬁnition of the Core. First, a selector chooses for every coalition a particular player in
the coalition to whom to assign the dividend of that coalition, i.e., a selector is a function
α: ΩN → N such that α(T ) ∈ T for all T ⊆ N . The selectope vector corresponding to selec-
tor α and game v ∈ GN is the vector sα(v) ∈ Rn given by sαi (v) =
∑
{T∈ΩN |α(T )=i} ∆v(T )
and assigns the dividend of any nonempty coalition T fully to the player α(T ) from this
coalition that is selected by the selector α. The Selectope S(v) of v then is the convex hull
of all selectope vectors, i.e.,
S(v) = Conv({sα(v)|α ∈ AN}),
with AN = {α: ΩN → N |α(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ ΩN} being the set of all selectors on N .
Now, if the players are ordered according to digraph D ∈ DN then we put as a restriction
on a selector that the dividend of a coalition should always be assigned to a player that
has no predecessors in the coalition. Formally this is done by considering only selectors in
the set
AND = {α ∈ A
N |for every T ∈ ΩN : [{i, j} ⊆ T and (i, j) ∈ D]⇒ α(T ) = j}.
We obtain the following deﬁnition.
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Definition 6.1 The Restricted Selectope of game with ordered players (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N
is the set S(v,D) = Conv({sα(v)|α ∈ AND}).
We refer to the solution that assigns to every game with ordered players its Restricted
Selectope as the Restricted Selectope solution. Obviously, for every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N we
have S(v,D) ⊆ S(v) since AND ⊆ A
N . Note that AND = ∅ if and only if there is no cycle in
D. Moreover, AND = A
N if and only if D = ∅. Therefore, S(v,D) = ∅ if there is a cycle in
D, and S(v,D) = Core(v) if D = ∅.
Example 6.2 The Restricted Selectope of the game with ordered players (v,D) of Exam-
ple 4.2 is given by S(v,D) = Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤}). 
We consider RC(v,D) to contain more ‘fair’ payoﬀ vectors than S(v,D). For example, in
the game (v,D) of Examples 4.2 and 6.2 it seems to be too tough on player 3 to exclude
him from any positive dividend, as is the case in S(v,D). However, the position of the
players in the digraph D should be reﬂected in the payoﬀ distributions, which is the case
in RC(v,D). The reason to discuss the Restricted Selectope here is that one encounters it
implicitly in several economic applications, as we discuss later.
Although the Core and Selectope are equivalent for totally positive TU-games, i.e.,
Core(v) = H(v) = S(v) for every v ∈ GN+ , the Restricted Core and Restricted Selectope
are diﬀerent. Clearly, on the class of totally positive games with ordered players also
the Restricted Selectope is a reﬁnement of the Core, but can be empty. The Restricted
Selectope solution satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity
and structural monotonicity. By Theorem 5.3 it then follows that the Restricted Selectope
is always a subset of the Restricted Core10.
Corollary 6.3 For every (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N it holds that S(v,D) ⊆ RC(v,D).
The Restricted Selectope solution also satisﬁes an alternative structural monotonicity prop-
erty which requires that a vetoed player earns zero payoﬀ.
Axiom (Strict structural monotonicity) For all (v,D) ∈ GN+ × D
N and j ∈ N , any
payoﬀ vector x ∈ F(v,D) satisﬁes xj = 0 whenever there is some i ∈ N \ {j} such that
both (i, j) ∈ D and j is vetoed by i in v.
A similar requirement for simple TU-games is discussed by Napel and Widgre´n (2001).
Note that the structural monotonicity property and the strict structural monotonicity
property do not imply one another. Replacing in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 the structural
10Note that it is also straightforward to give a direct proof of this.
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monotonicity property by the strict structural monotonicity property, we obtain charac-
terizations of the Restricted Selectope solution on the class GN+ × D
N of totally positive
games with ordered players.
Theorem 6.4 (i) The Restricted Selectope solution S satisfies efficiency, the null player
property, additivity, nonnegativity and strict structural monotonicity on GN+ ×D
N .
(ii) If solution F on GN+ × D
N satisfies efficiency, the null player property, additivity,
nonnegativity and strict structural monotonicity, then F(v,D) ⊆ S(v,D) for all (v,D) ∈
GN+ ×D
N .
Proof. (i) The Restricted Selectope solution S satisfying eﬃciency, the null player prop-
erty, additivity and nonnegativity follows similar as for the Harsanyi set H for TU-games in
GN in Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002). Further it follows straightforward that S satisﬁes
strict structural monotonicity.
(ii) Suppose that solution F on GN+×D
N satisﬁes the ﬁve properties. For x ∈ F(∆v(T )uT , D),
T ∈ ΩN , the null player property implies that xi = 0 for all i ∈ N \T , and eﬃciency implies
that
∑
i∈T xi = ∆v(T ). With nonnegativity it follows that xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T . Strict struc-
tural monotonicity implies that xj = 0 for all i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D since ∆∆v(T )uT (H) = 0
for allH = T . Hence x ∈ S(∆v(T )uT ,D), showing that F(∆v(T )uT , D) ⊆ S(∆v(T )uT , D).
Additivity of F and S then implies that F(v,D) ⊆ S(v,D) for all (v,D) ∈ GN+ ×D
N . 
Recall that S(v,D) = ∅ if D is cyclic. Considering solutions F(., D) on GN+ for a given
speciﬁc digraph D ∈ DN , part (ii) of Theorem 6.4 thus gives as a corollary that in that
case there is no nonempty solution satisfying the given properties.
Corollary 6.5 If D ∈ DN is cyclic then the only solution F(., D) on GN+ that satisfies effi-
ciency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity and strict structural monotonicity
is the empty solution F(v,D) = ∅ for all v ∈ GN+ .
7 The water distribution problem reconsidered
Applying the Restricted Core to the totally positive game with ordered players (v,D)
associated with a water distribution problem as described in Section 3, we obtain exactly
the set of allocations described at the end of that section. We illustrate this with an
example.
Example 7.1 Consider the water distribution problem among players N = {1, 2, 3}, such
that e1 = 1, e2 = e3 = 0, b
1(x) = 0, b2(x) = 0 and b3(x) = x for all x ≥ 0. So, the only
water inﬂow is at the most upstream player 1, while the most downstream player 3 is the
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only one that obtains a positive beneﬁt from water consumption. Player 2 has neither a
water inﬂow nor positive beneﬁt from water consumption, but is needed to let water pass
from player 1 to player 3. The corresponding river game is the unanimity game of the
‘grand’ coalition given by v(N) = 1, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. The Core is the full set of
eﬃcient nonnegative payoﬀ vectors Core(v) = {z ∈ IRn+ |
∑
i∈N zi = 1}.
The solution mu(v) of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) assigns the worth v(N) fully to
the most downstream player 3, while players 1 and 2 get nothing for letting the water pass
through to player 3. This coincides with the unique element in the Restricted Selectope
where the ordering of the players is from downstream to upstream reﬂected by the digraph
D− = {(3, 2), (2, 1)}. The payoﬀ vectormu(v) is also an extreme point of the corresponding
Restricted Core. Since ∆v(N) = 1 and ∆v(S) = 0 otherwise, the Restricted Core is given
by RC(v,D−) = PND− = {p ∈ P
N | p3 ≥ p2 ≥ p1}. By applying Theorem 4.5 we obtain
that RC(v,D−) = Conv({(0, 0, 1)⊤, (0, 1
2
, 1
2
)⊤, (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)⊤}).
On the other hand, the Restricted Core on the more natural ordering from upstream
to downstream, reﬂected by the digraph D = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}, is given by RC(v,D) = PND =
{p ∈ PN | p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3} = Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤, (
1
2
, 1
2
, 0)⊤, (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)⊤}), see Figure 2. This is
also a subset of the Core with three extreme points. One of these extreme points is the
allocation ml(v) assigning the dividend fully to the most upstream player 1. This is also
the unique element in the corresponding Restricted Selectope.
Note that the Shapley value, which distributes the worth equally among the three
players, is an extreme point of the Restricted Core corresponding to both orderings. 

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Figure 2: RC(v,D) of Example 7.1
We want to stress that our critique on the solutionmu of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is the
modeling, i.e., ordering the players from downstream to upstream. As shown in the example
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above, the Restricted Core can be applied to this ordering (yielding the solution mu as
one of its extreme points), but also to the reverse ordering from upstream to downstream,
yielding the marginal value vector ml as one of its extreme points. For any ordering the
Shapley value always is an extreme point of the Restricted Core.
8 Final remarks
In this paper we assumed that there is an ordering on the players in a totally positive
cooperative TU-game. This ordering restricts the payoﬀ distribution in the game and
we propose the concept of the Restricted Core as solution concept for such situations.
This Restricted Core provides a collection of Core payoﬀ distributions obtained by taking
into account the ordering when distributing the dividends. Theorem 4.3 states that the
Restricted Core is a subset of the Core of the unrestricted game which always contains
the Shapley value of the unrestricted game. We also provided axiomatic characterizations.
As a further reﬁnement we discussed the Restricted Selectope which assigns to any totally
positive game with ordered players a subset of the Restricted Core, but is empty if the
ordering contains a cycle.
Many economic applications are modelled by totally positive TU-games such as
sequencing games (see, e.g. Curiel et al. (1989)), auction games (see Graham et al.
(1990)), airport games (see Littlechild and Owen (1973)), telecommunication games (see
van den Nouweland et al. (1996)) and queueing games (see Maniquet (2003)). We gave
special attention to river games arising from water distribution problems. We saw that the
solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is the unique element in the Restricted
Selectope taking the ordering from downstream to upstream, and is an extreme point of
the corresponding Restricted Core. As an alternative we suggested the Restricted Core
corresponding to the ordering of the players from upstream to downstream.
In a similar way, one can obtain the hierarchical outcomes for (communication)
graph restricted games as introduced in Demange (2004). For communication graph games,
Myerson (1977) introduced the restricted game where to every coalition one assigns the
sum of the worths of all its components (i.e. maximally connected subsets) in the graph11.
Given a cycle free undirected communication graph Demange (2004) associates with every
node a directed tree obtained by choosing that node as the root, and for each of these
directed trees considers the marginal value vector of the restricted game corresponding
to orders where ‘lower ranked’ players enter before ‘higher ranked’ players. For every
11In these games with limited communication (graph) structure as introduced by Myerson (1977) the
edges of an undirected graph on the set of players represent binary communication links between the
players such that players can cooperate only if they are connected, see also e.g. Kalai et al. (1978), Owen
(1986) and Borm et al. (1992).
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directed (rooted) tree this hierarchical outcome is the unique element of the corresponding
Restricted Selectope corresponding to this tree and the restricted game.
Another game theoretic model in which players in a TU-game belong to a hierarchi-
cal structure are the games with a permission structure as considered in Gilles et al. (1992),
Gilles and Owen (1994), van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997)12. In
these games it is assumed that players need permission from other players before they are
allowed to cooperate within a coalition. So, instead of restricting payoﬀ distributions, in
games with a permission structure the cooperation possibilities are restricted13. Given the
sets of feasible coalitions, a restricted game is deﬁned which assigns to every coalition the
worth of its largest feasible subset. We want to stress that the approaches of restricted
cooperation (as in games with a permission structure) and restricted payoﬀ distribution
(as done in the underlying paper) are essentially diﬀerent. For totally positive games,
the Restricted Core is a subset of the Core of the unrestricted game and therefore reﬁnes
the concept of Core. In the models of restricted cooperation possibilities, the Core of the
restricted game is larger than the Core of the original game.
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